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ABSTRACT: The insight about maintenance tasks has evolved over the years in great depth. Different 
methodologies have been applied in industrial sectors such as the aviation, nuclear, chemical and 
manufacturing industries among others. Proposed methods include the Reliability Centered Maintenance 
approach, Condition Monitoring and Risk Based Inspection. In maritime industry, maintenance is broadly 
subdivided into three categories: corrective (or run-to-failure), preventive (or time-interval based) and 
predictive maintenance. Inadequately maintained vessels increase the operational cost, reduce ship 
availability and operability, cause frequent inspections on board the ship and create over-occupied crews. 
Furthermore, ship owners/managers try to combine their valuable experience in the actual marine field with 
the technological advances in order to minimize maintenance related disorders. In the present paper, the 
background of ship maintenance is shown along with its various categories. A novel methodology which 
combines a risk and criticality approach is also demonstrated using the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) tools. Moreover, a case study of machinery related 
equipment using actual field data demonstrates the results of the above mentioned method. Main outcomes 
are the identification of the critical items and operating procedures as well as determining the reliability of the 
system examined. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Shipping is a multifaceted industrial sector with great 
versatility and characteristics that make it differ from 
land-based and other industries. Accordingly, ship 
maintenance is adjusted to the specific qualities of 
this industrial sector. Shipping consists of a large 
number of companies/operators managing either a 
single ship or a fleet of tens of ships. Most of these 
companies are privately owned while some others are 
under state ownership. The assets are one-off items 
with their own design characteristics or at the best a 
small number of sister ships. The trading pattern of 
ships is worldwide and in most cases sailing in a 
harsher environment in comparison to the better off 
land-based conditions. 
 
Research activities over maintenance are well 
established in other industries while in shipping there 
has been lately an increasing interest at improving 
maintenance practices. Maintenance tasks themselves 
are more difficult to perform, monitor and evaluate 
compared to the same tasks occurring onshore. 
Furthermore, there have been accidents which they 
are attributed to not proper implementation of 
maintenance, among other reasons, see Erika 1999, 
Castor 2000, Prestige 2002 (Devanney, 2006). 
 
On the other hand, considerable savings can be 
achieved when implementing a structured 
maintenance policy. Available data from a marine 
consultancy company showed that when condition 
monitoring method and proper maintenance 
procedures were applied in a 40,000 GRT passenger 
vessel, savings exceeded US$ 350,000 between two 
dry-docking periods. All this without considering lost 
time/income in detentions, accidents occurring, off-
hire periods etc. In another case of an LPG vessel, 
the estimated cost saving came up to the amount of 
US$ 300,000 for the same time period. 
2 MAINTENANCE BACKGROUND 
In the following sections, the known maintenance 
methods & applications are briefly described (Figure 
1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Existing maintenance methods & applications in 
shipping industry 
 
Corrective maintenance (otherwise called hard-
time, run-to-failure, breakdown or reactive 
maintenance) was the first step towards ship 
maintenance. It is described as the action performed 
because of failure or deficiencies occurring or more 
generally, to repair an item to its operating condition 
(Dhillon, 1999). According to IACS (2001), a 
corrective maintenance procedure must consist of a 
process to identify the existing problem, establish the 
cause and propose, implement and evaluate feasible 
solutions. Main disadvantages of the corrective 
actions include high utilization of unplanned 
maintenance related activities, inadequate use of 
maintenance effort as well as high replacement part 
inventories. 
 
Corrective maintenance was followed by 
Preventive (or on-condition, scheduled or time-
driven) maintenance. In general, preventive 
maintenance addresses the scheduled inspections, 
which are performed so as to establish whether a 
component or equipment can still operate 
satisfactorily or determine the item’s deterioration 
(Mobley, 2002). Potential benefits incorporate an 
increase in available equipment, reduction of 
downtime and its relevant cost and improvement of 
safety and quality. On the other hand, drawbacks 
include preliminary replacement of an item before its 
useful life-cycle termination, increased inventory 
lists and more frequent access to the equipment under 
inspection without necessity. 
 
Predictive maintenance emerged as a further step 
after preventive tasks. It is described as the 
maintenance best required for the breakdown on 
parts where it is possible to tolerate a failure during 
system operation. Also, wherever it is possible to 
detect a failure through regular monitoring during 
normal operation (Andrews & Moss, 2002). It is the 
process that monitors regularly the condition of the 
item/equipment and ensures maximum intervals 
between repairs. Among its key advantages are 
providing actual data for planning the repair 
activities, early detection of potential failure modes, 
minimisation of unscheduled repairs and 
maximisation of the availability and operability of 
the system. Predictive maintenance can be further 
subdivided into Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM), Risk Based Inspection (RBI), Condition 
monitoring (CM) and Computerised Maintenance 
Management Systems (CMMS). 
 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a 
concept already introduced in industrial fields like 
the nuclear (Kadak & Matsuo, 2007), transportation 
(Carretero et al, 2003), defence (MoD, 2006) and the 
offshore sector (Conachey & Montgomery, 2003) 
among others. It tries to bridge the gap among 
different maintenance strategies like corrective, 
preventive and predictive and eliminate their 
drawbacks. According to Moubray (1997), RCM is a 
methodology for arriving at the most appropriate 
maintenance strategy for a specific piece of 
equipment, given knowledge about reliability 
characteristics, functional relationships and the 
equipment’s functional faults and their consequences. 
In the shipping industry, RCM is related to the 
machinery equipment of the vessel. 
 
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is a similar method 
introduced for describing the structural components 
of the ship or offshore installation (indicatively 
mentioned are Serratella et al, 2007, Ku et al, 2004 
and Faber, 2002). It brings together the concepts of 
failure identification and risk evaluation in order to 
come up with an appropriate inspection program. 
Moreover, it closely looks into the maintenance of 
the hull structure of the ships from a ‘risk-based 
structural analysis’ point of view. 
 
Condition monitoring (ConMon) is a system of 
regular scheduled measurements of plant and 
machinery health. Condition monitoring systems use 
various tools to quantify plant health, so that change 
in condition can be measured and compared. 
Condition Monitoring of the mechanical, electrical 
and thermal condition of plant, as well as identifying 
efficiency losses and safety critical defects can be 
carried out. The objective of condition monitoring is 
not only to identify defects, but also to discover the 
root cause of failure, so that that the cause can be 
engineered out. 
 
 
Maintenance methods 
Corrective Preventive 
Predictive 
RCM RBI ConMon CMMS 
Computerised Maintenance Management Systems 
(CMMS) are applications which try to combine the 
computerised planned maintenance system (PMS) 
and other maintenance techniques (Power, 2004). 
The fundamental idea is the integration of all the 
necessary information in one central database (i.e. 
planned and unplanned maintenance events, 
machinery monitoring, inventory/spare parts lists, 
etc) which interconnects the various departments of a 
shipping company with the ship itself. This means 
that the computer applications on the ship have to be 
simple to use, without complicated toolbars and 
menus. It also helps ship officers to cope with the 
complexity of the work they face on a daily 
operational routine while keeping the cost of such a 
system in reasonable levels. 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the adopted maintenance is described. 
The approach may be classified as a predictive 
maintenance tool and it combines the benefits and 
advantages of FMECA, FTA with dynamic gates and 
criticality analysis to carry out the evaluation of the 
reliability and availability of the examined system. 
 
At first, the well known tool of Failure Modes & 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used. FMEA is a 
qualitative process used to identify the potential 
problems of a machinery equipment/item and the 
effects that these problems may have in the overall 
operation of a system (Teng & Ho, 1996). FMEA can 
also provide a summary of other relevant information 
such as the detection and prevention methods for the 
failure event as well as the repair and unavailability 
time. Combined with the features of severity and 
frequency, it is developed into the FMECA (Failure 
Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis), which 
moreover determines the criticality of the problem 
occurring, thus providing a quantitative measure. 
 
As a second step, a Criticality matrix is developed 
based on the severity and the frequency of the 
failure/underperforming events (Table 1, Fig 2). 
 
Criticality is calculated as: 
 
Criticality = Severity x Frequency   (1) 
 
Table 1 Severity, frequency and criticality table 
Severity Frequency Criticality 
Level 1: minor Level 1: unlikely Cat 1: level 1-4 
(not critical) 
Level 2: marginal Level 2: low Cat 2: level 5-14 
(critical) 
Level 3: major Level 3: 
moderate 
Cat 3: level 15-
25 (very critical) 
Level 4: critical Level 4: high  
Level 5: catastrophic Level 5: very 
high 
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4 8 12 16 20 
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1 2 3 4 5 
 Frequency 
Figure 2 Criticality matrix 
 
The next step includes a further process using the 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). This is another very 
useful tool, which Bedford & Cooke (1999) describe 
as a means of forming a quantitative analysis of a 
system. In a FTA one attempts to develop a 
deterministic description of the occurrence of an 
event, which is the top event, in terms of the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of other intermediate 
events. Intermediate events/gates are also described 
further until, at the finest level of detail, the basic 
events are reached. In this case, when the top event is 
the failure of a system then the basic events are 
usually failures of components. Also, in order to have 
a better representation of a system under 
consideration, static and dynamic gates may be 
employed. Static gates represent the failure logic 
paths between various fault tree levels while dynamic 
ones consider the temporal order of the occurrence of 
input events. This will be better shown in the 
following case study. 
 
4 CASE STUDY 
The system that is described in this paper consists of 
one diesel generator (D/G 1) out of a four D/G 
system of a cruise ship. The main particulars of the 
vessel are presented in Table 2 and the ones of the 
D/G in Table 3. The D/Gs are used to provide the 
main propulsion of the ship as well as the power 
required for the onboard electrical equipment of the 
vessel. 
 
Table 2 Main particulars of the subject vessel 
Built 1990 
Ship type Motor sailing yacht 
Masts 5  
Capacity 308 passengers 
Length 187.0 m (including bow sprit) 
Breadth 20.0 metres 
Draft 5.0 metres 
Tonnage 14,745 GRT 
Service speed 10-15 knots 
Table 3 D/G characteristics 
Total no of D/G 4 
Rated kW 2,280 
Total HP 13,216 
Total kW 9,720 
Engine rpm 750 
Cylinder bore 320 mm 
Cylinder stroke 350 mm 
FO consumption 3 tonnes/24 hrs (normal conditions) 
 
At first instance, the FMECA tool is used to 
identify the initial features of the system under 
examination (Appendix-Table 1). The failure events, 
failure causes as well as the local and global effects 
are compiled while the detection and prevention 
method, the repair and unavailability times along 
with any additional remarks are also demonstrated. 
Apart from the above, the severity and frequency of 
the failure event is provided which will lead to the 
estimation of the criticality of the event. 
 
With the aid of the severity and frequency 
indicators, the criticality measure for each separate 
event is estimated. In this way, the critical 
items/components are identified, providing guidance 
for the preparation of the Fault Tree structure. For 
example, the “Engine preheating unit” has a severity 
figure of “4” and a frequency figure of “3”. 
Following equation (1), the criticality figure is 
estimated as “12”. Likewise, the items described 
below have a criticality figure of “12”, rendering 
them the critical items occurring from the FMECA. 
 
• The engine preheating unit 
• The turbocharger 
• The valves and piping of the fuel system 
• The alarms 
• The alternator and 
• The start air system 
 
Moreover, for performing the reliability analysis, 
a Fault Tree structure is generated using the 
Reliability Excellence software (Relex 2009). In this 
way, D/G 1 is divided in the following main groups 
(Fig. 3). 
 
• Main body/frame of D/G 
• Fuel system 
• Lub oil system 
• Miscellaneous/other components and 
• Air system and 
• The alternator as a single event 
 
 
Figure 3 Fault Tree structure for D/G 1 
 
At this point, it should be mentioned that for the 
representation of the groups in the Fault Tree as well 
as for reasons of better graphical layout, “Transfer” 
gates are employed (Fig. 3). 
 
Moreover, “OR” gates are used. This means that 
in order for the top event to occur, one of the sub-
events, need to occur in the first place. In this case 
study, “Sequence enforcing” as well as “Voting” 
gates are used (Fig. 4 & 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Fault Tree structure with a “Sequence enforcing” 
dynamic gate 
 
The “Sequence enforcing” gate determines that 
sub-events occur in a particular order (left-to-right) 
as they appear under the gate. 
 
 
 
Figure5 Fault Tree structure with a “Voting” gate 
 
The “Voting” gate indicates that the top event 
occurs if and only if m out of n inputs occur (in this 
case for the gate of “Other components” it is “3 out 
of 4” events). This denotes the importance placed on 
several of the inputs (i.e. engine preheating unit) in 
comparison to other events (i.e. special tools 
availability). Another “Voting” gate is used for the 
“Air system” with “2 out of 3” events.  
 
All of the above mentioned subcategories consist 
of basic events and gates describing the lower level 
that the analysis may reach, according to the 
available data. All the basic/end events are then 
populated with the actual failure data gathered from 
the mentioned vessel during its operation over a 
period of almost five years. In this case failure data 
include not only actual failure recordings but also 
underperforming events or changes/overhauling of 
equipment (Table 4). 
 
The different components in this table are 
presented as they were used to create the original 
Fault Tree structure. For example, the “Fuel system” 
consists of the fuel system-valves & piping, the fuel 
filter autoclean and the fuel filter duplex. Likewise, 
the “Air system” includes the start limiter, the start 
air system and the air cooler & manifold, etc. 
 
Table 4 Actual field data showing the Mean Time Between 
Failures (MTBF) for the operation of D/G 1 
Components MTBF (average 
hrs) 
Crankcase 21,240 
Cylinder heads, complete 1-6 8,808 
Filter, glacier oil 960 
Camshaft 21,240 
Governor 7,112 
Turbocharger overhaul 7,080 
Air cooler and manifold 7,488 
Start air system 7,080 
Start limiter 21,240 
Fuel system, valves and piping 2,208 
Fuel filter autoclean 21,240 
Fuel filter duplex 16,536 
Instruments 21,240 
Engine preheating unit 14,160 
Alarms 13,608 
Special tools 7,512 
Cooler lub oil 8,712 
Filter lub oil (duplex) 3,827 
Motor/starter lub oil pump 21,240 
Alternator #1 1,114 
Check vacuum in measuring cylinder 962 
Change sinted bronze filters/clean unit 3,818 
Function/operation test of units 2,508 
Pressure reducer test  2,755 
 
After the population of the events, the time-
dependent reliability calculations (computing time) 
are set. Start point is set to 0 while end time of 
calculations is set to 43,800 hours or else 5 years. In 
between, the calculation process is set to time 
steps/intervals of 2,190 hours to coincide with the 
quarterly interval period (seamanship practice of 3 
months period). The calculation method used is the 
“exact” method. In this case, higher accuracy on 
numerical results is achieved than other 
approximation methods. 
 
In this way, the reliability of the main system 
(failure of D/G 1) and sub-systems is estimated. 
Also, the availability of all the end-events is 
calculated and the results of the Fault Tree are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
 
5 RESULTS 
In this section the results of the reliability of the top 
event-“D/G 1” and the other interim gates/events are 
presented (Fig. 6). 
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Figure 6 Reliability of all the main gates/events of the D/G 1 
system 
 
As it can be seen, the reliability of most of the 
main and sub-systems deteriorates quite quickly with 
time (after 2,190 hrs). There are two systems which 
present relatively higher reliability rates (more than 
5,000 hours). The first one is the “Other 
components” system, which consists of the “engine 
preheating unit”, the “alarms”, the various 
“instruments” and the “special tools” events. The 
second system is the “Oil mist detectors” sub-system 
which is part of the “main body/frame” of the D/G 1. 
This sub-system includes the “vacuum in the 
measuring cylinder”, the “sinted bronze filters”, the 
“function/operation test of units” and the “pressure 
reducer test”. 
 
Fig. 7 also shows the availability of the end-events 
of the D/G 1 system. As we may observe, the less 
available items are the filter/glacier oil, the 
inspection intervals of the vacuum in measuring 
cylinder, the alternator and the valves and piping of 
the fuel system. 
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Figure 7 Availability of all the end-events of the D/G 1 system 
 
Furthermore, the discussion on the results shown 
in the above mentioned figures is carried out in the 
following paragraphs. 
6 DISCUSSION 
In the present paper, the different maintenance 
methodologies and practices are shown with specific 
interest in the shipping industry. A new risk and 
criticality approach to maintenance problems is also 
presented. In addition, an application using actual 
maintenance data from a cruise ship is demonstrated 
and the results are shown in Fig. 6 & 7. The low 
reliability figures of the different systems may be 
attributed to a number of reasons like not enough 
redundancy in the equipment available on board the 
ship, not following the correct maintenance intervals 
for the specific D/G or even improper recording of 
the maintenance sequence by the crew of the vessel. 
Measures to avoid this situation can be either to 
introduce spare equipment in place, train the crew or 
monitor the maintenance recordings in an effective 
way. 
 
In the case of the low unavailability figures of the 
end-events, such as the filters or the valves and 
piping of the fuel system, spare parts can be 
introduced to increase the availability of these 
components. The inspection intervals can be more 
frequent for the case of checking the vacuum in the 
measuring cylinders. As for the alternator, more 
information is needed to understand the reasons of 
the low availability rates (like a more detailed 
breakdown of the alternator to its different parts). 
This information (maintenance recordings) was not 
available at the time of this research. 
 
This new predictive maintenance method, which 
combines the tools of FMECA and FTA with 
dynamic gates in order to estimate the reliability and 
availability of a system and its components, is a first 
step towards a better understanding of the 
maintenance procedure as an entity. With the 
availability of more data in hand, it is believed that 
the present research can be expanded to cover the 
whole area of the machinery and hull structure of a 
ship with considerable benefits. Furthermore, with 
additional analysis including the implementation of 
reliability importance measures defining the 
criticality of failure events with more detail and cut-
sets estimation so as to determine the combination of 
events leading to the failure of the main system, more 
accurate and thorough results will be obtained. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 Part of the FMECA table for D/G 1 
Failed 
item 
Failure 
event Failure cause Effects 
Detection 
method 
Prevention 
method 
Seve
rity 
Frequ
ency 
Critic
ality 
Repair 
time 
Unavail
ability Remarks 
    Local Global         
1 Crankcase explosion high oily mist, 
lubrication system 
fault  
primary 
explosion, 
blackout 
casualty, 
fire, 
secondary 
explosion 
temperature 
monitor 
crankcase doors 5 1 5 n/a n/a Severe 
explosion in 
case of 
occurrence, 
possible 
casualty (not 
in this case) 
2 Cylinder 
heads 1-6 
leakage, 
overheating 
cracks, faulty 
exhaust valves, 
improper 
combustion 
high temp 
alarm, 
smoke 
detection/ala
rm 
stop 
engine 
high 
pressure/temp 
alarms 
proper 
monitoring of oil, 
exhaust & water 
pipes  
2 4 8 2 hrs 3-4 hrs proper 
maintenance 
3 Governor Erratic 
function 
electronic/mechani
cal control failure 
cannot/malf
unction load 
share 
stop 
engine 
frequency meter, 
kilowatt meter 
lub oil replenish, 
maintain 
electronic circuits 
3 3 9 2 hrs 3 hrs - 
4 Engine 
preheating 
unit 
cannot start, 
structural 
cracks due 
to thermal 
stress 
motor pump 
failure, dirty jacket, 
no fresh water 
treatment 
cracks, 
structural 
damage 
start 
failure 
Alarm proper water 
treatment 
4 3 12 3 hrs 4 hrs depending 
on jacket 
condition 
and fault 
(motor, 
jacket water, 
controls, 
etc) 
5 Turbochar
ger 
Bearing 
failure, 
seizure 
lack of lubrication, 
excessive carbon 
deposits, cracked 
blades, inlet filter 
chocked, not 
sufficient air 
pressure, surging 
bearing 
damage, 
turbine 
damage 
lower 
output, 
high fuel 
oil 
consumpti
on 
high exhaust 
temp, reduced 
efficiency, low 
scavenge 
pressure 
(surging) 
monitoring 
bearings, exhaust 
temp, scavenge 
pressure & temp 
4 3 12 6hrs 12-
24hrs 
cleaning 
with 
chemicals, 
etc 
 
 
